how well the profession is performing its responsibilities of self-regulation.
Mistrust and the Model R u l e s I t is doubtful that the legal profession's poor reputation for honesty and ethical standards could be so persistent without some genuine foundation in layers' norms of behavior. Yet, most layers are actually quite scrupulous (at least in my experience) about observing what they believe is expected of them under the profession's ethical standards. The possibility must therefore be at least considered that there is something about the ethical standards themselves that leads layers to act in ways the public fmds repugnant.
A principal purpose of this article is to consider the hypothesis that the public's view of layers is tied directly to negative reactions people have to two related advocacy norms that seem to be rooted in provisions of the Model Rules of Professional C~nduct.~ These norms are typically expressed in two particular practices of layers, namely: (1) pretending to disagree in the hope that, by not "conceding" a point, the l a y e r might get the client an added chance to avoid a legally prescribed liability, sanction, nonsuit or other undesired outcome; and (2) fostering misunderstandings by selectively invoking confidentiality in order to hide material parts of the trutb while vigorously (and misleadingly) asserting others. The fmt of these practices, which I shall call "fabricating controversy," is sometimes described more charitably as endeavoring "to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client's cause.'" The second, which I shall call "partial-truth advo~acy,"'~ emerges from a joint reading of the Model Rules on confidentiality and on diligence." Both of these practices are likely to be stoutly defended by many in the bar, perhaps even as crucial aspects of the adversq sy~tem.'~ At the same, however, neither of these practices would likely be recognized as fully "honest" or "ethical" as those conceptions are generally understood in ordinq, non-layer contexts. No one finds it easy to trust people who pretend things in order to get better than they deserve or who induce false understandings by means of partial disclosures and "half-truths." Yet, both of these norms of advocacy behavior are reinforced and propagated by a fair reading of the current Model Rules. Before much progress can be made to rehabilitate our profession's reputation for honesty and ethical standards, it will probably be necessq that the Model Rules themselves be clarified in certain respects.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983), as set forth A AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ANNOTATED
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (4th ed. 1999) (hereinafter "MODEL RULES"). Adopted in most of the states, the Model Rules contain modifications that vary from state to state. MODEL RULE$ Rule 3.1, cmt. [I] . 10 A fuller and more precise definition of patial-truth advocacy appears in part I11 "Abuse of Confidentiality," inpa. 11 MODEL RULES Rule 1.6 AND Rule 1.3, respectively. 12 This is a claim of necessity that is, to say the leasf debatable. See Joint Conference onProfessiona1 Responsibility, ProfemondRespodd@:Rep~ofthe JomtCo$erence, 44 A.B.A.J. 1158 (1959, reprmted m GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. AND DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 148-51 (3d ed. 1994) (specifically decrying the misuse of partisan advocacy to mislead distort or obfuscate, and declaring that a lawyer "trespassa against the obligations of professional responsibilities when his desire to win leads him to muddy the headwaters of decision"). See alsoPeter C. Kostant, BreedmgBetter Watchdogs:Mul~~ciplUUyPar62ersh@s inCorporateLegdPractice, 84 M I~L Rev. 1213, 1215-19,1253-58 (2000) (obsenring that the profession's [rleliance on a flawed model of legal e h c s " has led to other serious problems as well, helping to pave the way for competition from so-called multi&sciplimry practice f k s ) .
The balance of this article will be framed as a discussion of two proposals for modifying the Model Rules. One muld declare fabricated controversy to be out of bounds as a tactical tool. The other would expressly a f f i that it is an abuse of confidentiality for lamyers to engage in strategies of partial-truth advocacy, to assert partial truths while deliberately blding back other information that the l a y e r should know is needed in order not to mislead others. Both of these techniques, fabrication of controversy and partial-truth advocacy, tend to undercut the trial as a "search for truth"I3 and both interfere with negotiations as a search for fairness in transactions.I4 Both, moreover, are utilized by layers precisely because they undercut and interfere with the intended functioning of these processes. They are resorted to by diligent advocates when factual truth would ill-serve the client's interest at trial, and by diligent negotiators when truthful disclosure would likely prevent a client from getting a deal that the other party would make only if deluded.I5 Finally, and worst of all, both of these layering techniques detract from the legal system's ability to achieve the "gold standard" of justice and the rule of law, viz. the substance of the law applied to the events that actually occur. The first of the two reputatiomimpairing practices I will discuss is fabricating controversy, the strategic technique of pretending to disagree on issues of procedure or substance in an effort to obtain an ultimate resolution that the client likes better than having "the substance of the law applied to the events that actually occurred." When layers fabricate controversy they are making a play on basic features of the dispute-resolution process itself--the costs it imposes on the opponent, the uncertainties it engenders, and the opportunity for lucky accidents that it provides. By raising disingenuous disputes that then require "process" to resolve, a skillful l a y e r can exploit the potentials for error that are intrinsic to the process itself and turn those potentials to the client's advantage. Thus, when clients want to escape the law's prescribed liabilities or sanctions for things they have done, or to obtain other unmerited benefits, layers have a lawful way to advance these client "interests." By contesting issues on which the parties do not really disagree, a diligent advocate can secure for the client an added chance to "snatch victoty from the jaws of defeat."
FABRICATING CONTROVERSY
As long as pretended disputations are not frivolous or dilatoty," many layers see nothing wrong with such plays on the system's fact-fmding imperfections. Nor do they see anyhng wrong with wing to get their clients better than the clients legally deserve, for example, by avoiding the prescribed consequences for wrongs they have committed. The vety fact that many layers see things this way is, of course, part of the reason for the public's negative perception of the profession.
The current Model Rules do not seem to condemn these practices, either. The Model Rules do contain provisions that prohibit "frivolous" contentions and dilatoty tactics.I8 However, as we shall see," these prohibitions apparently do not prevent a l a y e r from asserting contentions that have a reasonable likelihood of being upheld even if the la\?yer h o w s (or reasonably should h o w ) that success in the contention will depend on somebody making a mistake, most likely by inaccurate fact fmding. Consider, for example, a l a y e r who has confidential information from which the l a y e r reasonably should h o w that the client's cause lacks substantive merit, e.g., the client really committed the tort alleged but the l a y e r nevertheless believes the case can be won. The lawyer may believe it can be won because, for example, the plaintiffs key witnesses are particularly vulnerable on cross-examination or because certain information the plaintiffs need to make their case is almost certainly beyond their reach or, even, unsuspected by them. I dare say few layers would maintain that there would be anyhng frivolous or dilatoty about going for victoty in such a case. The current Model Rules on frivolous and dilatoty contentions would seem to allow it and, arguably, Model Rule 1.3 (Diligence) may even command it.'' Nevertheless, to achieve legal victoty without substantive merit is not justice, and winnability alone is not a just standard of meritoriousness. To make it clear that the profession's responsibility to justice does not permit layers to seize evety available legal victoty, irrespective of actual factual merit, the Model Rules should contain an explicit prohibition on fabricating controversy, which might read as follows:
A l a y e r shall not fabricate controversy or otherwise pretend disagreements by putting a point into contention when the l a y e r h o w s or reasonably should h o w that there is no real difference between the parties' actual understandings of the facts or applicable law.
Fabricated Controversy is Parasitic to the Basic Function of Legal P r o c e s s A l a y e r may see a strategic value in contesting a factual point or issue even though, with reasonable investigation, the l a y e r should h o w that the parties have no genuine disagreement on the point or issue. For example, even without any underlying disagreement on some factual point the l a y e r may still see value in "making them prove it" simply because, on the particular evidence at hand the l a y e r has a reasonable shot at success and success on the point would be to the client's advantage. It may save the client i?om liability, sanction or other undesired legal consequence. In such situations there is, however, actually only a pretense of controversy. In effect, the l a y e r is making a naked play on the legal process, taking a stand in an effort to get a benefit or advantage that the substance of the law does not mean to provide. Similarly, when layers invoke procedures, formal requirements or defenses merely because the point seems "winnable" and advantageous, and not because there is any genuine disagreement on the legally relevant facts, the dispute is again only a pretense. Raising the dispute into controversy serves no purpose except to give the client a chance to gain from the process of disputeresolution itself. These pretended disputations are parasitic to the basic functioning of the legal process, which exists to resolve real disputes. They can only add to the system's costs while distracting from its mission, contributing to the public's impression that, with a smart layer, a person can escape from the burdens of the law.
The possibilities for pretending disagreement are manifold. Fabricated controversies can be concocted as to matters of procedure or of substance. They may relate to minor collateral points or to the core matters in question. However, whatever the specific context, the reason tbat fabricated controversies can be successful is genemlly always the same, namely, like all human systems the law's fact-fmding system is not perfect and can make mistakes. The traces left behind by legally relevant events are often fragmentaty and conflicting. Witnesses may have background weaknesses that can make cross-examination devastating even when their direct testimony is fully true. Or a crucial witness may refuse to cooperate, or may fail to appear entirely." Because of these and other elements of chance that are endemic to the process, skillful advocates can sometimes paint pictures of past events that are vety different, legally speaking, from the events that actually occurred or they can, alternatively, keep the opponent from presenting a picture that is true. It can all be done, moreover, without resort to direct falsehoods or other illegality.
While the discussion that follows here will focus on the litigation context, it bears remembering that the vety same sorts of parasitic resort to phony disputation can also occur in the context of transactions. By judiciously raising disputes over this or that issue, a l a y e r in negotiations can obfuscate, distract and otherwise create needs for a negotiated "resolutions," so the layer's client can then gain extra advantages from the resolutions that result, even when there was no real disagreement in the fmt place.23 This manner of bargaining may be regarded as simply "smart" negotiating tactics, or as underhanded depending on your point of view. Winnability vs. Justice-As evety l a y e r knows, there can be a big difference between being entitled to a legal outcome and being able to prove the facts that the law requires in order to establish that entitlement. This discrepancy between provability md entitlement can be the source of much injustice, and it can occur due to a variety of imperfections in the fact-finding process. For example, as noted in the preceding section, it can occur because one of the parties, due to bad luck or happenstance, simply lacks access to sufficient admissible evidence to prove the truth. It can occur because juries and others can make mistakes or be misled-especially if one of the advocates is forcefully pressing a portion of the trutb while deliberately concealing the remainder (see "Abuse of Confidential@," infra). Also, it can occur because parties sometimes are simply unable to afford what it takes to establish facts which with greater resources, they could readily have proved. Most generally, "imperfections" in the process can be understood to refer to any factor whatsoever whose effect is to allow a party, without violating any law or rule, to prevent the substance of the law from applying to the facts that actually occurred.
Whatever the source of the imperfections, layers and their clients may be understandably tempted to take advantage of them when, otherwise, the "law is against them" but they nonetheless desire to obtain a certain legal benefit (e.g., a money judgment) or to avoid a legally prescribed detriment or sanction. So even when there is no real disagreement with other side, and therefore no real "dispute" for the law's dispute-resolution machinety to resolve, they may be tempted to see the machinety itself as an opportunity, a chance for profit. By simply setting the machinety in motion on one or another potentially pivotal point, the l a y e r gets an added opportunity to turn defeat into victoty by taking advantage of the potential for error, for chance or for other miscarriage that is inherent in legal To some extent these sorts of systemic risks are unavoidable, and it will probably never be possible to eliminate entirely the perennial discrepancies that exist between actual legal entitlements and provability-in-fact-between winnability and justice. This does not mean, however, that the profession should condone conscious efforts by layers to seize the fortuitous advantages that may be gleaned from these discrepancies. Sometimes, too, layers may simply not h o w whether their client's cause has substantive merit or not; there may be simply no reason to h o w whether the underlying facts are in any way different from what the available evidence indicates. It does not, however, follow that layers are free to engage in "willful blindne~s'"~ and pretend controversy in cases where they do have reason to h o w . On the contrary, if on reasonable investigation a l a y e r should h o w the client's cause is not just, either in whole or in some particular, the ethics of our profession should clearly prohibit the fabrication of controversy in an effort to pretend otherwise. While it may be in the client's "interest" to gain legal advantages or to avoid disadvantages contrary to the substantive intentions of the law, it is not in society's interest or the profession's interest for layers to knowingly assist them in these ends. It is to these latter kinds of cases that the above-suggested addition to the Model Rules is meant to apply Fabricated Controversy Distinguished From Merely "Frivolous" or "Dilatory" Contentions-The justice effects of fabricated controversies may be reason to deplore them, but a fair interpretation of the current Model Rules seems to allow layers to raise issues without any real underlying disagreement as long as there is a reasonable chance of prevailing. The specific Model Rules that come closest to dealing with the question are Rule 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and contention^)'^ and Rule 3.2 (Expediting Litigation)." These two rules forbid frivolous and dilatoty advocacy, respectively. However, neither of these rules gives reason to think it is ethically wrong to raise an issue or contest a point just because the purpose is to obtain an ultimate outcome that is better for the client than "the substance of the law applied to the events that actually occurred." That is to say, neither gives reason to think it is wrong to controvert a point simply because the goal happens to be to help the client avoid a legally prescribed liability, sanction, nonsuit or other such "merited unpleasantness. On the contrary, under both of these rules a la\?yer is apparently justified in assetting a contention in litigation as long as the point has some chance of being winnable.28
The comments to the Model Rules make clear (and the rules themselves leave little doubt) that dilatoty refers to contentions raised for purposes of delay," and that the conception of "frivolous" contentions focuses on actions "primarily for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring a person"30 or contentions that are so obviously without merit there is virtually no likelihood a court would accept them.31 In other words, under the Model Rules' conceptions of frivolous and dilatoty, a position would be vindicated as non-iiivolous and nomdilatoty as long as a tribunal reasonabiy might sustain it. Ifthe law and available evidentiaq facts are such that a contention has a reasonable likelihood of being supportable or tenable in court, the contention would not be considered dilatoty or frivolous, as traditionally understo~d.~~ The adversarial tactic of fabricating controversies or pretending disagreement is, however, vety 26 "A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous . . " MODEL RULE$ Rule 3.1 27 "A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client." MODEL RULES Rule 3.2. dzerent from dilatoty or frivolous contentions, as traditionally understood; it is a distinctly unethical way to secure a legal advantage or to avoid a legal disadvantage. Fabricated controversy is not only vety dzerent from traditional frivolous or dilatoty advocacy but it is systemically much worse. The worst impact of iiivolous or dilatoty contentions is usually only to cause expense, wheel-spinning and perhaps, untoward pressure to settle. By contrast, the tactical purpose of fabricated controversy is to try to actually win, despite the fact that a proper substantive predicate for victoty is absent. In other words, the fabrication of controversy is a directed effort not just to delay or distract the rule of law but actually to derail it, by inducing a court or others to accept ultimate factual conclusions that neither the l a y e r nor the client takes to be true. Indeed the defming characteristic of fabricated controversy is that a factual (or legal) position is advocated even though it does not correspond to the beliefs about past events or the law that either the l a y e r or the client actually holds.33 Thus, while alleged instances of frivolous or dilatoty contentions can be erased or vindicated by a victoty in court, the vice of fabricated controversy is actually enhanced by victoty. The fact that the l a y e r manages to succeed in fooling a tribunal on a matter of trutb does not mean that urging the counterfactual position was legitimate advocacy or that the outcome was just. The fallibility or gullibility of juries, judges or negotiating counterparts is not the test of whether conduct is honest.
It may be objected, of course, that the foregoing description of "frivolousness" is too narrow, and that the Model Rules already prohibit fabricated controversy under the rubric of "fiivolous" conduct. This is possible, but it is not likely-and in any case such a prohibition (if it exists) is certainly not vety conspicuous. It is true that nothing contained in Rule 3.1 explicitly prevents a person i?om reading the conception of frivolousness more broadly than the rule's comments suggest, so that it would encompass layers' efforts to play the legal process by fabricating controversy. Since, however, Rule 3.1 is, in effect, an exception to the layer's core duty to diligently advance the client's interests,34 I think most layers would probably regard such a expansive reading to be highly dubious. As long as nothing in Rule 3.1 expressly forbids layers from wing to seize the fortuitous advantages that might be gained by plays on the process (as long as this can be done without breaking the law), a l a y e r may feel obliged to do so. A l a y e r may feel obliged that is, to bring or defend a proceeding, or to assert or controvert an issue, even when the l a y e r h o w s or reasonably believes that the larger outcome being sought is not merited under the actual facts and applicable law. 35 The example given earlier of a l a y e r who should h o w , on the basis of confidential information, that the client's tort defense case lacks substantive merit, that the client really committed the tort alleged is but one kind of case. Situations like this can be multiplied as clients engage l a y e r s in the hope of avoiding their legal comeuppances for past behavior, imploring their layers to "get me out of this." In real life, of course, factual histoty is often fairly messy, and layers many times do not h o w the 33 See proposed addition to the Model Rules, supra note 21 34 See MODEL RULE$ Rule 1.3. 31 The comment to Rule 3.1 specifies that the advocate has "a duty not to abuse legal procedure." MODEL RULE$ Rule 3.1, cmt [I]. It is not, however, obvious that it would be per se an "abuse" of legal procedure for a lawyer to invoke legitimate legal processes to help their clients escape the prescribed consequences of their acts. On the contrary, the comment hastens to specify that "[tlhe law, both substantive andprocedural, establishes the limits within which an advocate may proceed." Id. (emphasis added). Taken as a whole, the comments to Rule 3.1 do not appear to treat it as an "abuse" of legal procedure for lawyers to invoke it with the conscious object of f~ustrating others' effods to prove substantive entitlements to recoveries, defenses, or other legal dispositions, provided only that the lawyer has no purpose to harass or maliciously injure and the lawyer can make a plausible argument for invoking the legal procedure in question.
actual facts with much cettainty. Under present Rule 3.1, however, the l a y e r has no duty even to try to form a reasonable belief on whether the client's cause is a just one within the intendment of the law.36 Thus, the l a y e r may fairly conclude from present Rule 3.1 that, in the name of "not beingjudge-andjuty of my own client," the l a y e r should adopt a posture of willful blindne~s,~' to "see no evil, hear no evil," so the lawyer can assert with a clear conscience contentions that the actual facts do not The ABA's Ethics 2000 Commission has proposed modifications to Model Rule 3.1 and their proposed modifications would remedy some of these difficulties. Under the proposals, for example, it would be a violation of professional ethics for a l a y e r to "bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless the lawyer reasonably believes that there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous."39 A new proposed sentence in the comments would make clear that "reasonably believes" means a l a y e r would at least be expected to investigate and to form a reasonable belief and could no longer resort to willful blindness, as described in the preceding paragraph.
However, the Commission's proposal still would not remedy the distinct problem of fabricated as opposed to merely frivolous or dilatoty conduct. In the Commission's proposal, the pivotal criterion for action still centers on the concept of "frivolous," and that concept is still defined in the traditional narrow terms of harassment, malicious injuty or machinations that are legally hopeless-too narrow to reach the problem of fabricated controversy. Therefore, the Commission's proposed modifications still would not declare it improper for layers to make plays on the system's fact-fmding imperfections to avoid or defeat the substance of the law. Layers still would be able to say that, under a fair interpretation of Rule 3.1, it is enough to justlfy asserting a contention in litigation that the point has a chance of being winnable. 36 The duty of competence includes, according to the comments, a requirement that the lawyer inquire into and analyze the legal and factual elements of the problem. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.1. It is certainly not clear, however, that this ~u l e requires lawyers to follow up on leads just because those leads would put a reasonable person on notice that the client's cause or objective is not ajust one. That is to say, it is at all not clear that the rules impose any duty whatever for the lawyer ever to t r y to form a belief of the factual justness (as opposed to plausibility or winnability) of the client's cause or objective. This latter section implies that, in order to have probable cause to contest an issue, an attorney mustfom a reasonable belief as to the merits. While the lawyer is not personally required to actually have probable cause to initiate or continue proceedings (according the to Restatement comments), id. 5 674 cmt a lawyer who acts without probable cause must do so "primarily for the purpose of aiding h s client in obtaining aproper adjudication of his claim," id. (emphasis added). However, lack of proper purpose for adjudication exists, for instance: "when the person bringing the civil proceedings is aware that h s claim is not meritorious." Id. 5 676 cmt. c. The same comment adds that a person "cannot believe that the claim is meritorious . . . if he realizes that the adludication will not be in his favor unless the court o r j u~y is misled." Id The upshot is, then, this: According to the Restatement of Tods, a lawyer may not lawfully proceed in litigation unless the lawyer either (a) reasonably believes that the client's claim is founded on actual facts (probable cause), or (b) actually believes that the client could win without the c o u t or jury being misled as to any matter of fact or law (proper adjudication). Fabricating Controversies and the Challenge of "Equal Justice'-It is frequently observed that there is a substantial shortfall in legal services to the less well off in our society, and that addressing this shortfall is among the impottant responsibilities of our profession. However, it is likely that one of the principal contributing causes of this shortfall is our particular vision of the adversq system. One particularly problematic aspect of that vision is the idea that, if a case has a reasonable chance of being won, then the l a y e r ought to pursue it with the full force of zealous representation, even if l a y e r has "confidential" howledge that the cause may be substantively unmerited. For instance, according to this vision, a l a y e r for a corporation should zealously defend the corporation against a tort claim even if the l a y e r confidentially h o w s that the corporation's employees indeed committed the tort in question, acting in the scope of their employment. Even worse, some prosecutors think they are entitled to bring the full force of the state down on a defendant even when they do not themselves believe the defendant is guilty; they think it is enough to prosecute that a jury can probably be persuaded to convict.40 As long as the l a y e r believes the case canbe won or plausibly defended on the "facts" and law, the current ethic seems to allow (and perhaps, even, require) that the l a y e r press for victoty as zealously as possible-whatever may be the layer's actual private assessment of the basis for the action. Rather than seeing service to justice as being any part of any layer's individual ethical responsibility, it is viewed instead as solely and exclusively the responsibility of the system as a whole.
However, this aspect of our particular adversq ethic has especially unfortunate effects when a layer's zealous representation skills are unleashed full force against a person who is either poorly represented or not represented at all. It is especially the persons who are in under-represented classes in our society who are likely to be unable to adequately test and rebut the evidence that is mounted against them. It is especially the under-represented who will likely be unable to make the case for prevailing even when, on the law and facts, they should. The problem of "unequal justice" has no simple solution, but it would at least be mitigated if, unlike today, all layers had a clear ethical responsibility to refrain from fabricated controversy in situations where they h o w , or reasonably should h o w , that their clients should not prevail. By clearly prohibiting the fabrication of controversy, the Model Rules would better assure that the negative effects of the present shortfall of legal services is not exacerbated by the adversq excesses of the legal profession itself Summing up the Problem of Fabricated ControversyTo make clear that it is wrong to concoct controversy in the hope of provoking an ultimate legal miscarriage, there must be additional language, beyond the changes proposed by the Ethics Zl00 Commission. The Model Rules need an amendment, such as the one suggested above, to make it clear that the adversarial tactic of fabricating controversies, or pretending disagreement on any point of contention, is a distinctly unethical way to secure a legal advantage or to avoid a legal disadvantage. Given the traditionally limited understanding of the frivolousness and dilatoriness concepts, the Model Rules need a specific reference to pretended or fabricated controversy, as set forth in the suggested language above.
ABUSE OF CONFIDENTALlTY
The
of$ce of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand. . . any manner of fraud or chicane.4'
Layer-client confidentiality provides important public benefits, but there are also significant detriments that can flow from its misuse.42 When layers routinely withhold "damaging" information, their calculated nomdisclosures and partial disclosures can foreseeably lead to false understandings in the minds of others. Obviously, it is not the purpose of ihe l a y e r duty of coniidentiality to foster false understandings; it is merely an unintended by-product. To make partial disclosures of fact with a purpose to deceive or when material deception is foreseeable, whether it be done in bargaining or in litigation, is an abuse of confidentiality.
In order to preserve the benefits of coniidentiality while preventing the detriments and abuses that can occur, a new paragraph (c) should be added to Rule 1.6, as follows: (c) It is an abuse of confidentiality for a layer, in any proceeding or matter, to pursue a strategy or design of selectively revealing information when the l a y e r has or claims a duty to conceal other information without which the revealed information would be misleading or deceptive on any issw of material fact.
The purposes of this proposed new paragraph would be to clarlfy that Rule 1.6 is not intended to foster deception; it would expressly prohibit layers from misusing coniidentiality as part of stratagems of partial-truth advocacy. "Partial-truth advocacy" means any form of advocacy that is intended to distract from or obfuscate the material facts of a matter, or to cause others to form erroneous conclusions about such facts, by affiatively stressing part of the trutb while asserting a duty to hide other parts of the truth. The proposed new paragraph would declare that layers have a professional obligation to refmin from knowingly pressing or advancing half-truths in the representation of clients.
Detriments that Can Flow From Abuses of Confidentiality-Contidentiality is, for many
practical reasons, a crucial feature of the layer-client relationship. The rule of coniidentiality is not, however, an unalloyed benefit to clients, the profession or the system of justice. There is a dehite downside evety time a l a y e r claims an ethical duty to conceal some key part of the truth. The major downside is, of course, that the rule of confidentiality causes otherwise "available" and material information to be withheld from persons who need it to make informed judgments in private matters and to cany out justice in accordance with the law.43 Despite the vety important objectives that justify confidentiality, its use must therefore be kept in careful balance with the needs of justice, which depends on truth. When truth will bring a client unpleasant consequences, there is obviously a temptation to disguise or conceal. But the law can only apply to the facts that are before it. Ifthe facts are distorted by partial truths, so will be the application of the law, and justice will founder These negative effects are not, moreover, confiied to miscarriages of justice in individual cases. The misuse by layers of the rule of confidentiality is no doubt partly responsible for the deep-seated wariness and apprehension that the public feels toward layers, for the idea that layers deal regularly in half-truths all too often having something up their sleeves. As surveys cited earlier there is a widespread public impression that layers cannot be fundamentally trusted. This distrust is unfohnate not merely for the profession but for the whole justice system. The misuse of confidentiality may sometimes work to the advantage of certain clients, but the advantage is purchased at a high cost. When layers misuse confidentiality and deal in partial truths they reduce their credibility overall, a detriment to all of the la\?yers1 clients. When justice is in the hands of professionals whose full and unstinting fidelity to truth is a matter not merely of doubt but also of abundant grim humor, the effect can hardly strengthen public trust in the rule of law.
The Model Rules should clearly reflect that the proper purpose of confidentiality is not to obstruct the truth; that is only a regrettable by-product. The proper role of the rule of confidentiality is to shield the client, so the client can be open with his or her l a y e r without fear that the l a y e r might later step forward to bear witness for the adversa~y.~~ When, however, a l a y e r deliberately adopts and pursues a strategy of partial truth advocacy, of presenting certain evidence while selectively withholding other material evidence, the rule of confidentiality acts not merely as a shield but becomes, instead, a tool of attack. It becomes a device or scheme to distort, deceive and obstruct.
Obstruction is precisely what occurs when a l a y e r zealously urges the existence of certain facts while willfully concealing other facts that the l a y e r reasonably knows are needed to avoid fostering false or erroneous inferences. Whether the layer's immediate purpose is merely to distract from the truth or to distort it, the ultimate goal is the same: to prevent the substance of applicable laws from applying to the facts that actually occurred-to derail the rule of law.
Ordinary Honesty and "Honesty" Under Model Rule 1 . 6 . 4 s stated in the introduction, most layers are rather scrupulous about their ethics and careful to avoid lies; yet the public's distrust of layers runs deep. If layers seldom lie, why the bad reputation for honesty? The problem is, I th& rooted in a variance of ideas of the vety concept of "honesty," a variance that is reflected in the Model Rules. Among the public at large, honesty in not generally understood in merely the cramped and narrow sense that layers often have in mind ("no outright lies") but in a far more expansive sense. In this broader sense, an honest person means someone who takes care never to mislead other people. It means a person who does not make it a practice to deliberately hold back crucially pertinent information while w i n g to persuade others. Foremost, an honest person means one who regards responsibility for the full and complete truth to be the personal responsibility of each and evety individual, not as just the collective responsibility of some larger "system."
By contrast, the lawyer's standard of honesty under Rule 1.6 is not nearly as onerous as the M See supra notes 3-6. 41 Note that, strictly speaking, I refer here only to the ethical duty of confidentiality, not to the evidentiaIy rule of attorney-client privilege, which shelds clients from having their own lawyers be impressed into service as witnesses for the adversaIy. S~~M O D E L RULE$ Rule 1.6, cmt. 5.
general public standard. The layer's standard of honesty is instead fitted to a particular conception (albeit not a necessary conception) of the adversq system. In this version of the adversq system, the advocates owe virtually their entire loyalty not to truth but to clients. The assumption behind Rule 1.6 seems to be that the full and open truth is not the personal responsibility of any individual l a y e r in particular, but only of the justice system as a whole, a system in which the players may do whatever they can, short of crime or outright lies, to encourage whichever misconceptions happen to serve their cause. If any of the resulting misconceptions need to be corrected, it is up to the adversq to see that the job gets done. Although an ethical l a y e r does not lie or help the client to lie, the l a y e r has a far more subtle art. By carefully choosing what to disclose and conceal, the lawyer weaves stories that are false out of statements that are true.
By purposely withholding information or willfully undermining accurate but "damaging" evidence, layers can frequently cause jurors and others to form misleading impressions of their clients and past events. Most layers would probably assert, moreover, that it is not merely the right but the duty of layers to bend portrayals of the truth to their client's advantage, even if that means inducing others to fall into mistaken beliefs. When a business client does not want to reveal the whole stoty in negotiating a deal, it is not the layer's job to disturb the false impressions the other side forms as a result. If a guilty client wants to say "I didn't cb it," then that client's nomguilt is the picture of reality the lawyer is expected to convey. In effect, layers often encourage others to form conceptions of reality that do not even purport to correspond to the actual facts as either the l a y e r or the client honestly sees them.
All of this is done, to be sure, with generally high objectives. There are obviously important values other than truth, and most layers surely believe that the false impressions they may convey are in pursuit of those values. However, those values do not include a "right" to obtain legal advantages that are not merited under the actual facts of a case or to avoid legal disadvantages that the law would prescribe if the full truth were revealed. When layers succeed in conveying false impressions in the pursuit of unmerited legal advantages or to protect their clients from legal accountability, people feel that justice has been not merely deceived but cheated. And for many outside the profession, that is a problem.
It is not enough to say, in response to these concerns, that "no human system can be perfect." By tolerating misuse of the rule of confidentiality in partial-truth advocacy, the present Rule 1.6 allows the imperfections to be built right into the process, and the public has no trouble seeing this. Almost evetyone suspects that the vety reason many clients seek legal counsel is to avoid the unpleasant consequences that the law prescribes for cases such as theirs-stated bluntly, to avoid the intent of the law. Some people simply do not want the results that the law provides for the actual facts of their situation, and they think that, with a smart layer, "undesired legal results can be avoided, legally, under the system that we have. And they are right.
The result, however, is a relatively high level of public distrust of layers, and that can readily redound to the discredit of the justice system that layers maintain. The distrust is not, therefore, a minor tangential annoyance or merely the problem of an insular profession, but it is something that can cut to the heart of the public's basic civic faith in the rule of law. For better or worse, most people probably think the core ideal of justice can only be served if the substance of the law applies to the events that actually occur. The concept of "right" is seen as based on trutk and not merely a matter of who wins regulated competitions to reinvent the past. People expect the law to provide genuinely deserved results, not just "due" process.
As long as layers in negotiations and advocacy do not even purport to present the full and objective truth as they or their clients honestly see it, no amount of professed concern about values "other than truth" is going to change the declining esteem in which the public holds our profession and the system ofjustice it maintains and serves.
The Special Problem of the Criminal Defense Context-It may seem hard in the civil context to reach a better balance between the goals of confidentiality and the truth needs of justice, but it may seem virtually impossible to do so in criminal defense. A criminal defendant has, after all, a constitutional right to "effective assistance" of counsel in mounting the defense.46 But how can a criminal defense l a y e r possibly hope to convince a juty that the defendant is not guilty except by selectively stressing the "helpfuY evidence while downplaying or hiding the damaging stuff! Partial-truth advocacy seems integral to the process and, in many cases, the vety essence of the game. The fallacy here seems to be the notion that an accused cannot be considered to have received effective assistance of counsel unless the l a y e r has tried to assert a full-blown exoneration defense, if that is what the accused wants.
As far as the question of "effectiveness" goes, there does not appear to be any empirical evidence that criminal defendants would be worse off, on the whole, if defense layers swore off strategies of selective nomdisclosure and partial-truth advocacy. Indeed, innocent defendants (presumably the ones we are most concerned to acquit) would probably be generally better off if criminal defendants were represented by l a y e r s whose reputations for probity were beyond reproach.
When Chief Justice Earl Warren was a California county prosecutor, he and the public defender developed a relationship of trust that apparently worked to the considerable advantage of the innocent accused. Warren told the public defender that any time he was convinced Warren was prosecuting an innocent person, he should tell Warren so. Then, according to the defender, Warren "would let me look at his files and, if that didn't change my mind, Warren would not prosecute. He trusted me to be as honest with him as he was with me." 47 What layers sometimes seem to forget is that, if criminal defense layers are none too trustworthy in their manner of defense, it does none of their clients a service. A person who makes himself generally not believable is one who will not be believed.48
For guilty defendants, of course, a believable l a y e r may not always be better. In particular, having a lawyer who will not play games with truth may mean it will be hard to put on a successful exoneration defense unless you can successfully bamboozle your own layer. This would present a clear drawback for guilty defendants who want to pretend innocence in the hope of getting an unmerited reduction of charge, dismissal or decision not to prosecute. Ifthey tell their honest l a y e r the truth the game may be up. By lying they take the substantial risk of depriving their lawyer of the truthful information the l a y e r may need to get the best deal. Even ifthis is so, however, it is still not a sound reason for lawyers to try to get judges and juries to swallow versions of past events that they should h o w are not true. Layers should not dishonestly withhold information, pretend controversy or distract from truth just so the guilty can have the aid of counsel to assert a false defense. In a world of honest men and women, the scoundrel may be at a disadvantage, but that does not mean honest people should act like scoundrels in order to compensate.
When all is said and done, it cannot be denied that it would probably be harmful to some criminal defendants if all la\?yers eschewed all partial-truth advocacy. It is, however, equally likely that such a change would provide a defmite advantage to other defendants, especially those who are innocent or are "not-guilty-as-charged." These latter classes of defendants would almost certainly be better off if their layers' presentations could be more readily belie~ed.~' Still, it may be objected, there is the Constitution. It secures both a right to effective counsel and a right to make the govemment prove its case. Thus, the argument goes, unless layers can pretend their guilty clients' innocence even when they know the facts, clients will be forced to make an unconstitutional choice: They will forced to choose between their constitutional right to effective counsel and their constitutional right to put the govemment to its proof Putting the matter like this, however, overstates the case. In the first place, "one cannot invoke the Sixth Amendment [right to counsel] as a justification for presenting what might have been a halftruth.'"' Moreover, there 6 no suggestion that the mles against involuntaty self-incrimination or the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt should not continue to apply in all their force. Even if the defendant's counsel refused to engage in partial-truth advocacy, the govemment could still be put to its proof The only suggestion is that a defendant who wants to controvert the government's case would be expected to do so truthf~lly.~' The defendant would not have a "right" to present misleading evidence or knowingly disparage accurate proof in the hope that some undeserved advantage might emerge. The Supreme Court has never held the Constitution to require more than this.
True, the accused has the ultimate authority to decide on whether to plead guilg2 and since the lawyer must abide the defendant's choice, the lawyer has no right to throw in the towel just because the l a y e r disbelieves the defendant's plea. What, then, should the honest l a y e r do? If the defendant pleads not guilty and f m l y professes innocence, the layer's posture should be one of constant and resilient suspicion of all incriminating evidence, including any prior admissions by the defendant himselt: If, however, the defendant admits guilt in confidence but says to the l a y e r "I want to make them prove it," then the honest layer's posture of suspicion is modified, to fit the client's own stoty. While the l a y e r should still "mak[e] sure that the prosecution can prove the State's case with evidence that was lawfully obtained and may lawfully be considered by the trier of fact,"53 it would be dishonest to go so 49 See Humbach, supra note 1, at 112-24 for further related discussion of problem of criminal defense counsel and confidentiality. far as to controvert the truthfulness or credibility of witnesses whose testimony agrees with the client's own version of the facts.54 In other words, once the state does succeed in sufficiently proving its case with lawfully obtained admissible evidence whose tenor the defendant does not in fact dispute, then the defendant has received all that he or she is entitled to. If the l a y e r were to tty to undercut that evidence, even though it is consistent with the defendant's own (confidential) stoty and the l a y e r has no reason to doubt it, then the l a y e r would be departing from the "search for truth'' and embarking upon a game. It would be, in short, to fabricate controversy.
Similarly, it would k dishonest for a l a y e r to present evidence favorable to the client if that favorable evidence would be foreseeably and materially misleading in the absence of other facts that the l a y e r is duty-bound to keep confidential. Such an abuse of confidentiality goes beyond the layer's duty of "defending the proceeding [so] as to require that evety element of the case be e~tablished,"~~ and enters into the realm of creating alternative realities that are calculated to distract the fmder of fact. In short, if the defense l a y e r has no truthful alternative stoty to sell, then the l a y e r cannot honestly pretend there is one and, therefore, he or she is effectively consigned to merely testing the government's 56 case.
While the foregoing discussion focuses on criminal defense, it is not meant to imply that prosecutors should not also be subject to comparable, if not even stricter, prohibitions against coyness with the truth. The only reason for stressing the defense context is that certain unique features of that context (defendant's right to plead not guilty, the constitutional right to counsel and the presumption of innocence) make a more extended discussion necessary.
Confidentiality in Federal Criminal Prosecutions-For better or worse, recent developments in kderal law suggest that the defense layer's duties of candor and full disclosure may, at least in federal prosecutions, already be much broader than typically thought today. Consider, for example, the layer's obligations under 18 U.S.C. 5 1001, as amended by the False Statements Accountability Act of 1996: 5 1001. Statements o r entries generally (a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, 14 Unless, of course, the lawyer has some independent ground for thinking that the witnesses are in fact lying or erring. 55 See MODEL RULES Rule 3.1 16 I have heard the objection that, as a practical matter, a defense cannot be very effective if the jurors are not presented with a credible case for innocence but are told, instead, that the only question for them to decide is whether the government has presented sufficient proof. The thought here seems to be that jurors want to decide the defendant's fate based on their beliefs about who did the crime infact, not on the basis of a technical legal test. In other words, if jurors h l y believe the defendant did if they are not likely to be impressed by defense arguments that, guilty or not, the defendant should be let go if government's proof is technically insufficient.
However, the very notion that a guilty defendant cannot be convicted except on "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" carries with it the corollaq that a real task of fact-finders is to make determinations about the sufficiency of the government's proof--whether it shows guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. To say thatjurors cannot be trusted with knowledge of the h e nature of their task is to make a serious indictment of the j u~y system as we know it-claiming i n effect that the system must rest on a fundamental deception or else it will not work correctly. It is a claim that I, for one, do not accept. If is the case that defense lawyers in our system cannot "effectively" assist their clients except by presenting half-truths and invented scenarios, then the system is more morally retrograde than I am prepared to concede. knowingly and willfully-(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick scheme, or device a material fact; (2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or (3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entty; shall be fmed under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
(b) Subsection (a) does not apply to a party to a judicial proceeding, or that party's counsel, for statements, representations, writings or documents submitted by such party or counsel to a judge or magistrate in that proceeding. 57 Notably, 5 1001 can apply to any out of court statement in any federal proceeding.
Consequently, if a federal prosecutor wants to fmd out what a defense attorney knows about the facts of a client's case, all that the prosecutor needs to do, it seems, is to ask with appropriately probing questions. The defense attorney could of course claim privilege and refuse to respond but, ifthe attorney has a truthful answer that would work favorably for the client, then a refusal to answer promptly could easily harm the client's interest-say, in subsequent plea bargaining. The delayed answer might seem too much like a concocted stoty when offered up at a later date. Anyway, defense attorneys are ordinarily eager to share exculpatoty facts with the prosecution and, indeed, if the defense attorney has a response that would help the client, there would likely be a duty to answer.58 That being so, the attorney's claim of privilege would be eloquent in itself, an implicit revelation of the unfavorable or "damaging" information whose existence the prosecutor seeks to confirm. By carefully framing the questions put to defense attorneys, a prosecutor could easily gain at least enough such revelations to shatter a potential pleabargain or, if the attorney's "admissions" got to the jurors, to prevent an acquittal.
Unfortunately, the boxed-in defense attorney has little room to maneuver under 5 1001. Ifthe attorney attempts to maintain confidentiality by deflection or other verbal ploys implying lack of knowledge ("I don't know") or by "exculpatoty no''-type responses, he or she runs the risk of committing a federal felony under 5 1001.59 The statutoty language of 5 1001 is vety broadly worded in prohibiting such verbal ploys ("conceals, or covers up by any trick scheme, or devicen6'). For its part, the Supreme Court has cast doubt on the possibility that there are any implicit exceptions in 5 100 1, expressly rejecting the argument (in relation to 5 1001) that "the Court may interpret a criminal statute more narrowly than it is ~ritten.'~'
In short, unless the Supreme Court "fmds" an unwritten exception in 5 1001 in some future case, the federal defense attorney's ethical duty of confidentiality may already be, in effect, subject to and limited by a duty not to "conceal" or "cover up," imposed by federal law. There is, of course, the constitutional right to counsel, but that right does not include the right to do any thing that would constitute "violating the law,I6' and 5 1001 is manifestly a law. The only way it might not be "law" is if Congress does not have the constitutional power to make such a modification of the extant contours of layer-client confidentiality, as we have come to know them. If not, then 5 1001, as applied to layers, is unconstitutional. While there is some authority that there may be a degree of sixth amendment rightto-counsel protection for the attorney-~lientprivilege,~~ there is no reason at this point to think today's Supreme Court will hold that the current balance between the rule of confidentiality and the trutb needs of justice is written in constitutional stone."
VI. CONCLUSION The justice system seeks to influence human behavior by providing various legal advantages and imposing various liabilities whose application depends for the most part on the things that people do. Many times people will see it as personally desirable to seek a legal advantage that is not merited under the law or to avoid a liability that is called for by the law, given the facts of their own particular situation. One effective way to do tbis is to fabricate controversy in order to make a play on the system and take advantage of the potential for error, for chance or for other miscarriage that is inherent in legal process. Another is to keep the actual facts of past events obscure. With a l a y e r who manipulates the facts, a client can escape the intent of the law.
Abuse of confidentiality and fabrication of controversy are both tactics that can play a major role in layers' effoa to lead the law to misapply. The fact that many lamyers tbink it is permissible to do these things in order to help their clients escape the law's intent merely shows that there is a widespread ambivalence toward the actual rule of law. However, the profession's responsibility to justice does not permit layers to seize evety available legal victoty, irrespective of actual factual merit. It does not permit the misuse of confidentiality as a sword that enables advocates to mislead by means of calculated partial disclosures. It does not permit l a y e r s to fabricate controversy as a strategy to skirt the rule of law. These two techniques may sometimes serve the interests of individual clients, especially those who would be discomfited by full and impartial enforcement, but they bring the profession into disrepute and, therefore, disserve the interests of clients and the nation overall.
In order to strengthen the public's confidence in the justice system we must make it easier than it is now for the public to trust the layers who are its custodians. Layers should never fabricate controversy as a tactic to derail justice and should never abuse the duty of confidentiality by selectively portraying reality in betrayal of that trust.
